We consider a stochastic differential equation that is controlled by means of an additive finite-variation process. A singular stochastic controller, who is a minimiser, determines this finite-variation process while a discretionary stopper, who is a maximiser, chooses a stopping time at which the game terminates. We consider two closely related games that are differentiated by whether the controller or the stopper has a first-move advantage. The games' performance indices involve a running payoff as well as a terminal payoff and penalise control effort expenditure. We derive a set of variational inequalities that can fully characterise the games' value functions as well as yield Markovian optimal strategies. In particular, we derive the explicit solutions to two special cases and we show that, in general, the games' value functions fail to be C 1 . The non-uniqueness of the optimal strategy is an interesting feature of the game in which the controller has the first-move advantage.
Introduction
We consider a one-dimensional càglàd process X that satisfies the stochastic differential equation
where ξ is a càglàd finite variation adapted process such that ξ 0 = 0 and W is a standard one-dimensional Brownian motion. The games that we analyse involve a controller, who is a minimiser and chooses a process ξ, and a stopper, who is a maximiser and chooses a stopping time τ . The two agents share the same performance criterion, which is given either by 
or by
e −Λt dξ t + e −Λτ g(X τ + )1 {τ <∞} ,
whereξ is the total variation process of ξ and
for some positive functions h, g,δ : R → R + . The performance index J v reflects a situation where the stopper has the "first-move advantage" relative to the controller. Indeed, if the controller makes a choice such that ∆ξ 0 = 0 and the stopper chooses τ = 0, then J v x (ξ, τ ) = g(x). On the other hand, the performance index J u reflects a situation where the controller has the "first-move advantage" relative to the stopper: if the controller makes a choice such that ∆ξ 0 = 0 and the stopper chooses τ = 0, then J u x (ξ, τ ) = |∆ξ 0 | + g(x + ∆ξ 0 ). Given an initial condition x ∈ R, (ξ * , τ * ) is an optimal strategy if
for all admissible strategies (ξ, τ ), where "w" stands for either "v" or "u". If optimal strategies (ξ * v , τ * v ), (ξ * u , τ * u ) exist for the two games for every initial condition x ∈ R, then we define the games' value functions by
respectively Zero-sum games involving a controller and a stopper were originally studied by Maitra and Sudderth [11] in a discrete time setting. Later, Karatzas and Sudderth [7] derived the explicit solution to a game in which the state process is a one-dimensional diffusion with absorption at the endpoints of a bounded interval, while, Weerasinghe [17] derived the explicit solution to a similar game in which the controlled volatility is allowed to vanish. Karatzas and Zamfirescu [9] developed a martingale approach to general controller and stopper games, while, Bayraktar and Huang [1] showed that the value function of such games is the unique viscosity solution to an appropriate Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation if the state process is a controlled multi-dimensional diffusion. Further games involving control as well as discretionary stopping have been studied by Hamadène and Lepeltier [5] and Hamadène [4] . To a large extent, controller and stopper games have been motivated by several applications in mathematical finance and insurance, including the pricing and hedging of American contingent claims (e.g., see Karatzas and Wang [8] ) and the minimisation of the lifetime ruin probability (e.g., see Bayraktar and Young [2] ).
The games that we study here are the very first ones involving singular stochastic control and discretionary stopping. Combining the intuition underlying the solution of standard singular stochastic control problems and standard optimal stopping problems by means of variational inequalities (e.g., see Karatzas [6] and Peskir and Shiryaev [12] , respectively), we derive a system of inequalities that can fully characterise the value function u. We further show that these inequalities can also characterise the value function v as well as an optimal strategy. For this reason, we call u generator of an optimal strategy. Surprisingly, we have not seen a way to combine all these inequalities for the generator u into a single equation. Our main results include the proof of a verification theorem that establishes sufficient conditions for a generator to identify with the value function u and yield the value function v as ell as an optimal strategy, which we fully characterise. In this context, we also show that the two games we consider share the same optimal strategy and we prove that v(x) = max u(x), g (x) for all x ∈ R.
The non-uniqueness of the optimal strategy when the controller has the first-move advantage is an interesting result that arises from our analysis (see Remark 1 at the end of Section 4). We use the inequalities characterising a generator and the verification theorem to derive the explicit solutions to two special cases. The first one is the special case that arises if X is a standard Brownian motion and h, g are quadratics. In this case, the generator u is C 1 but the value function v may fail to be C 1 . The second special case is a simpler example revealing that both of the value functions u and v may fail to be C 1 and showing that the optimal strategy may take qualitatively different form, depending on parameter values.
The paper is organised as follows. Notation and assumptions are described in Section 2, while, a heuristic derivation of the system of inequalities characterising a generator is developed in Section 3. In Section 4, the main results of the paper, namely, a verification theorem (Theorem 1) and the construction of the optimal controlled process associated with a given generator (Lemma 1) are proved. In Sections 5 and 6, the explicit solutions to two nontrivial special cases are derived.
Notation and assumptions
We fix a filtered probability space (Ω, F , F t , P) satisfying the usual conditions and carrying a standard one-dimensional (F t )-Brownian motion W . We denote by A τ the set of all (F t )-stopping times and by A ξ the family of all (F t )-adapted finite-variation càglàd processes ξ such that ξ 0 = 0. Every process ξ ∈ A ξ admits the decomposition ξ = ξ c + ξ j where ξ c , ξ j are (F t )-adapted finite-variation càglàd processes such that ξ c has continuous sample paths,
where ∆ξ s = ξ s+ − ξ s for s ≥ 0. Given such a decomposition, there exist (
whereξ c is the total variation process of ξ c . The following assumption that we make implies that, given any ξ ∈ A ξ , (1) has a unique strong solution (see Protter [13, Theorem V.7] ).
for some constant K > 0, and σ 2 (x) > σ 0 for all x ∈ R, for some constant σ 0 > 0.
We also make the following assumption on the data of the reward functionals defined by (2)-(4).
Assumption 2
The functionsδ, h, g : R → R + are continuous and there exists a constant δ > 0 such thatδ(x) > δ for all x ∈ R.
It is worth noting at this point that, given ξ ∈ A ξ , we may have E[ξ t ] = ∞, for some t > 0. In such a case, the reward functionals given by (2)-(3) are well-defined but may take the value ∞.
3 Heuristic derivation of variational inequalities for the value function u u u
Before addressing the game, we consider the optimisation problems faced by the two players in the absence of competition. To this end, we consider any bounded interval ]γ 1 , γ 2 [, we denote by T γ 1 (resp., T γ 2 ) the first hitting time of {γ 1 } (resp., {γ 2 }), and we fix any constants
controller is concerned with solving the singular stochastic control problem whose value function is given by
In the presence of Assumptions 1 and 2, u ssc is C 1 with absolutely continuous first derivative and identifies with the solution to the variational inequality
with boundary conditions
where the operator L is defined by
(see Sun [16, Theorem 3.2] ). In this case, it is optimal to exercise minimal action so that the state process X is kept outside the interior of the set
Given an initial condition x ∈ ]γ 1 , γ 2 [, a stopper faces the discretionary stopping problem whose value function is given by
where X is the solution to (1) for ξ ≡ 0. In this case, Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that v ds is the difference of two convex functions and identifies with the solution, in an appropriate distributional sense, to the variational inequality
where L is defined by (8) (see Lamberton and Zervos [10, Theorems 12 and 13] ). In this case, the optimal stopping time τ • identifies with the first hitting time of the so-called stopping region
namely, τ • = inf{t ≥ 0 | X t ∈ S ds }. Now, we consider the game where the controller has the "first-move advantage" relative to the stopper and we assume that there exists a Markovian optimal strategy (ξ * , τ * ) for the sake of the discussion in this section. We expect that this optimal strategy involves the same tactics as the ones we have discussed above. From the perspective of the controller, the state space R splits into a control region C and a waiting region W c . Accordingly, ξ * should involve minimal action to keep the state process in the closure R \ int C of the waiting region W c for as long as the stopper does not terminate the game. Similarly, from the perspective of the stopper, the state space R splits into a stopping region S and a waiting region W s , and τ * is the first hitting time of S. Inside any bounded interval ]γ 1 , γ 2 [ ⊆ W s , the requirement that (ξ * , τ * ) should satisfy (5) suggests that u should identify with u ssc defined by (7) for C γ 1 = u(γ 1 ) and C γ 2 = u(γ 2 ). Therefore, we expect that u should satisfy
Inside any bounded interval ]γ 1 , γ 2 [ ⊆ W c , the requirement that (ξ * , τ * ) should satisfy (5) suggests that u should identify with u ds defined by (9) for C γ 1 = u(γ 1 ) and C γ 2 = u(γ 2 ). Therefore, we expect that u should satisfy
To couple the variational inequalities (10) and (11), we consider four possibilities. The region WW := W c ∩ W s where both players should wait is associated with the inequalities
Inside the set CW := C ∩ W s where the stopper should wait, whereas, the controller should act, we expect that Lu + h ≥ 0, |u ′ | = 1 and g < u.
Inside the part of the state space WS := W c ∩ S where the controller would rather wait if the stopper deviated from the optimal strategy and did not terminate the game, we expect that
Finally, the region CS := C c ∩ S in which the stopper should terminate the game should the controller deviate from the optimal strategy and did not act, we expect that
These inequalities give rise to the following definition. Here, as well as in the rest of the paper, we denote by int Γ and cl Γ the interior and the closure of a set Γ ⊆ R, respectively.
Definition 1 A generator of an optimal strategy is a continuous function u : R → R + that is C 1 with absolutely continuous first derivative inside R \ B, where B is a finite set, satisfies
and has the following properties, where
(I) Each of the sets C, S W and S C is a finite union of intervals, and B ⊆ S C ⊆ C.
(II) u satisfies
Lebesgue-a.e. in int S C \ B. In the following definition, we introduce some terminology we are going to use.
Definition 2 Given a generator of an optimal strategy u, we call the regions W, C and S waiting, control and stopping, respectively. Also, we call reflecting all finite boundary points x of C such that
for all ε > 0 sufficiently small, and repelling all other finite boundary points of C.
It is worth noting that requirement (III) of Definition 1 implies that all points in B are repelling. The special case that we solve in Section 5 involves only reflecting boundary points. On the other hand, the special case that we solve in Section 6 involves repelling as well as reflecting points and B = ∅.
A verification theorem
Before addressing the main result on this section, namely Proposition 1, we consider the following result, which is concerned with the construction of the process ξ * that is part of the optimal strategy associated with a given generator. The main idea of its proof is to paste solutions to (1) that are reflecting in appropriate boundary points.
Lemma 1 Consider a function u : R → R + that is a generator of an optimal strategy in the sense of Definition 1. There exists a controlled process ξ * ∈ A ξ such that
where X * is the associated solution to (1).
Proof. Given a finite interval [α, β] and a controlled process ξ ∈ A ξ , suppose that there exists a pointx ∈ [α, β] and an (F t )-stopping time τ with P(τ < ∞) > 0 such that the solution to (1) is such that X τ =x on the event {τ < ∞}. On the probability space (Ω, F , G t , Q), where (G t ) is the filtration defined by G t = F τ +t and Q is the the conditional probability measure P(· | τ < ∞) that has Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to P given by dQ dP
. In this context, there exist (G t )-adapted continuous processesX andξ such thatξ is a finite variation process,
(see El Karoui and Chaleyat-Maurel [3] and Schmidt [15] ). 
In view of this observation, we can see that, if we definẽ
thenX is the solution to (1) that is driven byξ ∈ A ξ ,
for all t > τ . Using the same arguments and references, we can show that, given an interval [α, ∞[, a pointx ∈ [α, ∞[, a controlled process ξ ∈ A ξ and an (F t )-stopping time τ such that the solution to (1) is such that X τ =x on the event {τ < ∞}, there exist processesX and ξ ∈ A ξ satisfying (1) and such that
Similarly, given an interval −∞, β , a pointx ∈ −∞, β , a controlled process ξ ∈ A ξ and an (F t )-stopping time τ such that the solution to (1) is such that X τ =x on the event {τ < ∞}, there exist processesX andξ ∈ A ξ satisfying (1) and such that
Given a generator of an optimal strategy u, we now use the notation and the terminology introduced by Definitions 1 and 2 to iteratively construct a process ξ * ∈ A ξ such that (16)- (18) hold true by means of the constructions above. To this end, we introduce the following notation, which is illustrated by Figure 1 . If int C = ∅ and x ∈ C, then we recall that we use u ′ − (x) (resp., u ′ + (x)) to denote the left-hand (resp., the right-hand) first derivative of u at x, we define
− (x) < 1, and we note that ζ(x) ∈ R because u is real-valued. On the other hand, given any x ∈ R, we define
with the usual conventions that sup ∅ = −∞ and inf ∅ = ∞. The algorithm that we now develop terminates after finite iterations because each of the sets C, W is a finite union of intervals. STEP 0: initialisation. We consider the following four possibilities that can happen, depending on the initial condition x of (1).
If int C = ∅ and x ∈ int C (e.g., see the points x 2 , x 3 , x 4 in Figure 1 ), then we define ξ 0 t = ζ(x) − x for all t > 0. If we denote by X 0 the corresponding solution to (1) and we set τ 0 = 0, then X 0 has a single jump at time τ 0 ,
In this case, X 0 ∈ B if x ∈ B ⊆ C.
If ℓ(x) = −∞ and r(x) = ∞, which is the case if int C = ∅, then we define ξ 0 = 0, we denote by X 0 the corresponding solution to (1) and we let τ 0 = ∞. If int C = ∅, x ∈ R \ int C and either of ℓ(x), r(x) is reflecting (e.g., see the points x 1 , x 5 in Figure 1 ), then we define ξ 0 = 0, we denote by X 0 the corresponding solution to (1) and we set τ 0 = 0.
If int C = ∅, x ∈ R \ int C and both ℓ(x), r(x) are repelling if finite (e.g., see the point x 6 in Figure 1 ), then we consider the (F t )-stopping times
where X † is the solution to (1) for ξ = 0, and we set
in which expression, we define ζ ℓ(x) − ℓ(x) (resp., ζ r(x) − r(x)) arbitrarily if ℓ(x) = −∞ (resp., r(x) = ∞). If we denote by X 0 the corresponding solution to (1) and we set τ 0 = T r(x) ∧ T ℓ(x) , then X 0 has a single jump at the (F t )-stopping time τ 0 ,
is reflecting, and, on the event {T r(x) < T ℓ(x) } ∈ F τ 0 , the point X
In this case, we may have X 0 τ 0 ∈ B but X 0 τ 0 + / ∈ B and X 0 t / ∈ B for all t < τ 0 . STEP 1: induction hypothesis. We assume that we have determined an (F t )-stopping time τ j and we have constructed a process ξ j ∈ A ξ such that, if we denote by X j the associated solution to (1), then (16)-(18) are satisfied for ξ j , X j in place of ξ * , X * and for all t ≤ τ j instead of all positive t. Also, we assume that, if P(τ j < ∞) > 0, then one of the following two possibilities occur: Step 0 provides such a construction for j = 0. In particular, the last possibility there gives rise to Case (II) for
On the other hand, the second possibility there is such that P(τ j < ∞) = 0, while the remaining two possibilities give rise to Case (I).
STEP 2 . If P(τ j < ∞) = 0, then define ξ * = ξ j , X * = X j and stop. Otherwise, we proceed to the next step.
STEP 3 . We address the situation arising in the context of Case (II) of Step 1; the analysis regarding Case (I) is simpler and follows exactly the same steps. To this end, we first consider the (F t )-stopping timeτ = τ j 1 A
and we note that X ĵ τ = x j 1 on the event {τ < ∞}. We are faced with the following possible cases.
If both of ℓ(x j 1 ), r(x j 1 ) are finite and reflecting, then we appeal to the construction associated with (19)-(20) for ξ = ξ j , X = X j ,x = x j 1 and τ =τ to obtain processesξ,X that are equal to ξ j , X j up to timeτ and satisfy (20) for all t >τ . We then define
The result of this construction is such that X ) is finite and reflecting), then we proceed in the same way using the construction associated with (21)-(22) (resp., (23)- (24)).
If ℓ(x j 1 ) is finite and reflecting and r(x j 1 ) is finite and repelling, then we consider (21)-(22) and, as above, we construct processesξ,X that are equal to ξ j , X j up to timeτ and satisfy (22) for all t >τ . We then consider the (F t )-stopping timeτ † and the process ξ j+1 ∈ A ξ given bŷ
we denote by X j+1 the associated solution to (1) and we define
In this case, we may have X τ j+1 ∈ B but X τ j+1 + / ∈ B and X t / ∈ B for all t ∈ ]τ j , τ j+1 [. ) is finite and reflecting, then we are faced with a construction that is symmetric to the very last one using (23)-(24). STEP 4 . Go back to Step 2.
We now prove the main result of the section. It is worth noting that we can relax significantly the assumptions (27)-(28). However, we have opted against any such relaxation because (a) this would require a considerable amount of extra arguments of a technical nature that would obscure the main ideas of the proof and (b) (27)-(28) are plainly satisfied in the special cases that we explicitly solve in Sections 5 and 6.
Theorem 1 Consider a function u : R → R + that is a generator in the sense of Definition 1, let ξ * ∈ A ξ be the control strategy constructed in Lemma 1, let X * be the associated solution to (1) and define v(y) = max u(y), g(y) , for y ∈ R.
Also, given any ξ ∈ A ξ , define
where X is the associated solution to (1), and note that τ *
In this context, the following statements are true.
for all τ ∈ A τ and all initial conditions of (1).
for some constant
) is an optimal strategy for the game with performance criterion given by (2) (resp., (3)) and v(x), u(x) satisfy (6) for every initial condition x of (1), namely, v and u are the value functions of the two games.
Proof. Given a generator u, we denote by u ′′ the unique, Lebesgue-a.e., first derivative of u ′ in R \ B and we define u ′′ (x), u ′ (x) arbitrarily for x in the finite set B. In view of (16), we can use Itô's formula and the integration by parts formula to calculate
where
Rearranging terms and using (17)- (18), we obtain
It follows that, given any finite (F t )-stopping timeτ ,
Similarly, we can calculate
Combining (30) with (17) and the facts that 0 ≤ g(x) ≤ u(x) for all x ∈ R \ C = int(W ∪ S W ) and Lu(x) + h(x) ≤ 0 Lebesgue-a.e. in R \ C, we can see that, given any T > 0 and any (F t )-stopping time τ ,
the last inequality following thanks to (25). These inequalities and the positivity of h, g imply that the stopped process M * τ is a supermartingale and E[M *
T ∧τ ] ≤ 0. Therefore, we can take expectations is (32) and pass to the limit T → ∞ using Fatou's lemma to obtain the inequality J v x (ξ * , τ ) ≤ v(x). Making similar reasoning with (31), we derive the inequality J u x (ξ * , τ ) ≤ u(x), and (I) follows. To prove (II), we consider the (F t )-stopping time τ * v defined by (26) with X * instead of X, and we note that
Combining this observation and the definition of τ * v with the facts that g(x) ≤ u(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ W and v(x) = g(x) for all x ∈ S, we can see that
and v(x)1 {τ * v >0} = u(x)1 {τ * v >0} . In view of these observations, (30) and the fact that Lu(x) + h(x) = 0 Lebesgue-a.e. in W, we can see that, given any T > 0,
If we denote by (̺ n ) a localising sequence for the stopped local martingale M * τ * v such that ̺ n > 0 for all n ≥ 1, then we can see that these identities imply that
In view of (27) and Assumption 2, we can pass to the limit as n → ∞ using the monotone and the dominated convergence theorems to obtain J v x (ξ * , τ * ) = v(x). We can use (31) and the observations that
similarly. To establish Part (III), we consider any admissible ξ ∈ A ξ and we note that (30) remains true with ξ, X instead of ξ * , X * ifτ is replaced byτ ∧ τ * v because B ⊆ S. Also, we note that
In view of the facts that g(x) ≤ u(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ R \ S and u(x) ≤ g(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ S, we can see that this observation and the definition of τ *
and v(x)1 {τ * v >0} = u(x)1 {τ * v >0} . Combining these observations with the fact that Lu(x) + h(x) ≥ 0 Lebesgue-a.e. inside int[(W ∪ C) \ S], we can see that (30) implies that, given any T > 0,
where M is defined as in (29). If (̺ n ) is a localising sequence for the stopped local martingale M τ * v such that ̺ n > 0 for all n ≥ 1, then these inequalities imply that
In view of (28) and Assumption 2, we can pass to the limit as n → ∞ using the monotone and the dominated convergence theorems to obtain J v x (ξ, τ * ) ≥ v(x). In general, the inequality τ * v ≤ τ * u may be strict because, e.g., we may have x ∈ S and x + ∆ξ 0 ∈ R \ S. In such a case, the set t ∈ [0, τ * u [ | X t ∈ B may not be empty but it is finite. Therefore, we can use Itô's formula to derive (30) with ξ, X instead of ξ * , X * and withτ ∧ τ * v replacingτ . Combining this result with the observations that X t ∈ cl(R \ S) for all 0 < t < τ * u and u(X τ * u + ) ≤ g(X τ * u + ), we can derive the inequality J u x (ξ, τ * ) ≥ u(x) as above. Finally, Part (IV) follows immediately from Parts (I)-(III) and the fact that (28) implies trivially (27).
Remark 1 An inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 reveals that the optimal strategy (ξ * , τ * u ) of the game where the controller has the first-move advantage is highly non-unique. Indeed, in the presence of (28), (ξ * ,τ * u ), whereτ * u is any (F t )-stopping time such that X * τ * u + 1 {τ * u <∞} ∈ S, in particular, (ξ * , ∞), is also an optimal strategy. It is worth noting that a similar observation cannot be made for the game where the stopper has the first-move advantage. Both of the special cases considered in the following two sections provide cases illustrating this situation (see Propositions 4, 5, 7 and 8).
The explicit solution to a special case with quadratic reward functions
We now derive the explicit solution to the special case of the general problem that arises when
for all x ∈ R, for some constants δ, κ, λ > 0 and µ ≥ 0. In our analysis, we exploit the symmetry around the origin that the problem has, we consider only sets Γ ⊆ R such that {−x | x ∈ Γ} = Γ and we denote Γ + = Γ ∩ [0, ∞[. Also, we recall that the general solution to the ODE
is given by
In the special case that we consider in this section, the controller should exert effort to keep the state process close to the origin. On the other hand, the stopper should terminate the game if the state process is sufficiently far from the origin. In view of these observations, we derive optimal strategies by considering generators that are associated with the regions
for some constants α, β > 0 (see Definition 1). In particular, we derive three qualitatively different cases that are characterised by the relations β < α, α < β or α = β, depending on parameter values (see Figures 2-4) . Given such generators, Theorem 1 implies that the associated optimal strategies can be described informally as follows. The controlled process ξ * has an initial jump equal to −(x + β) (resp., −(x − β)) if the initial condition x of (1) is such that x < −β (resp., x > β). Beyond time 0, ξ * is such that the associated solution to (1) is reflecting in −β in the positive direction and in β in the negative direction. On the other hand, the optimal stopping times τ * v , τ * u are the first hitting times of S as defined by (26). In view of these observations, we focus on the construction of the generators u in what follows.
In the first case that we consider, the generator u identifies with the value function of the singular stochastic control problem that arises if the stopper never terminates the game (see Figure 2) . In particular, we look for a solution to the variational inequality
of the form
The requirement that u should be C 2 along the free-boundary point β, which is associated with the so-called "principle of smooth fit" of singular stochastic control, implies that the parameter A should be given by
while β > 0 should satisfy
We also define α > 0 to be the unique solution to the equation
Proposition 2 Equation (38) has a unique solution β > 0, which is strictly greater than δ 2κ
. Furthermore, α > β if and only if δλ − κ < 0 or δλ − κ = 0 and µ > 0
in which case, α >
2λ
and the function u defined by (36) for A < 0 given by (37) is a generator in the sense of Definition 1.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that equation (38) has a unique solution β > 0 and that this solution is strictly greater than δ 2κ
. In particular, we can verify that
For this value of β and for A < 0 given by (37), the function u defined by (36) is C 2 and satisfies the variational inequality (35) because
To see (42), we first note that u ′′′ (x) = (2δ) 
we can see that u ′′ (x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, β[. It follows that u is an even convex function, which, combined with the identities u ′ (0) = 0 and u ′ (β) = 1, implies (42). To prove (43), it suffices to show that
The definition and the C 2 continuity of u imply that f 1 (β) = 0. Combining this observation with the inequality f
> 0 for all x ≥ β, which follows from the fact that β > δ 2κ
, we can see that (44) . Using the definition (36) of u, we calculate
If δλ − κ < 0, then this identity implies trivially that We next consider the possibility that the game's value function when the stopper has the "first-move advantage" identifies with the value function of the optimal stopping problem that arises if the controller never acts (see Figure 3) . In this case, we look for a solution to the variational inequality
The requirement that v should be C 1 along the free-boundary point α, which is associated with the so-called "principle of smooth fit" of optimal stopping, implies that the parameter A should be given by
while α > 0 should satisfy
In this context, the function u defined by
provides an appropriate choice for a generator if α < 1 2λ
. Proposition 3 Suppose that δλ − κ > 0. Equation (48) has a unique solution α > 0, which is strictly greater than
. This solution is less than or equal to if and only if
in which case, the function u defined by (49) for A > 0 given by (47) is a generator in the sense of Definition 1.
implies that the right-hand side of (48) defines a strictly decreasing function on R + \ κ+δµ δ(δλ−κ)
. Combining this observation with the fact that tanh is a strictly increasing function, we can see that (48) has a unique solution α > 0 and that this solution is strictly greater than κ+δµ δ(δλ−κ)
. In particular, we can see that
which implies that the solution α of (48) In what follows, we assume that the problem data satisfy (50), in which case, u is associated with the regions B = ∅, S
, ∞ and W + = [0, α[. In view of Definition 1, we will show that the function u is a generator if and only if we prove that
The inequality (52) follows immediately from the convexity of u and the fact that u ′ (α) = 2λα ≤ 1. The inequality (53) is equivalent to
Since α > . On the other hand, we can use (51) to calculate
, α , and (53) follows. The inequality (54) is equivalent to
In view of (51), this is true if and only if
⇔ δλ − κ > 0. This inequality is indeed true because 2δ(λ+µ) δλ−κ > 1 ⇔ δλ + κ + 2δµ > 0, and (54) follows.
The third case that we consider "bridges" the previous two ones and is characterised by the fact that the free-boundary points α, β may coincide in a generic way. In particular, we look for a generator u that is given by
for some α > 0, and satisfies
(see Figure 4) . The requirements that u should satisfy (57) and be C 1 at α imply that the parameter A should be given by
while the free-boundary point α > 0 should satisfy
Proposition 4 Suppose that δλ − κ > 0 and
. Equation (59) has a unique solution α > 0 such that
If the parameters are such that (60) is true, then the function u defined by (56) for A < 0 given by (58) is a generator in the sense of Definition 1 if and only if
On the other hand, if the parameters are such that (61) is true, then 1 2λ
< α if and only if
in which case, the function u defined by (56) for A > 0 given by (58) is a generator in the sense of Definition 1.
imply that equation (59) has a unique solution α satisfying (61). In particular, we can see that 1 2λ < α ⇔ (63) is true.
In view of Definition 1, we can see that the function u is a generator of an optimal strategy if and only if |u
If the parameters are such that (61) The results that we have established thus far involve mutually exclusive conditions on the problem data. To exhaust all possible parameter values, we need to consider the following result that involves a generator u of an optimal strategy that is associated with the regions
which are consistent with (34) for α = β = δ 2κ
, and the proof of which is straightforward.
Proposition 5 Suppose that δλ − κ > 0 and
. The function u defined by
is a C 1 generator of an optimal strategy in the sense of Definition 1.
6 A special case with generators that are not
We now solve the special case of the general problem that arises when
for some constants δ, λ > 0. In this context, the controller has no incentive to exert any control action other than to counter the stopper's action because h ≡ 0. We therefore solve the problem by first viewing the game from the stopper's perspective. Also, we exploit the problem's symmetry around the origin in the same way as in the previous section. We first consider the possibility that the generator of an optimal strategy u identifies with the value function of the optimal stopping problem that arises if the controller never takes any action. To this end, we look for a solution to the variational inequality
for some constants A and α ∈ ]0, 1[. A generator of this form is associated with the regions
and is depicted by Figure 5 . To determine the constant A and the free-boundary point α, we appeal to the so-called "principle of smooth-fit" of optimal stopping. We therefore require that u is C 1 at −α and α to obtain
and α = − 1
In this case, Theorem 1 implies that the associated optimal strategy can be described informally as follows. The controller should never act (i.e., 
Proof. In view of (70) and Definition 1, we will prove that u is a generator of an optimal strategy if we show that
and
The inequality (74) follows immediately by the facts that u is C 1 at α and the restriction of x → u(x) + λx 2 − λ in [α, ∞[ is strictly convex. The inequality (75) is equivalent to If the problem data is such that (72) is not true, then we consider the possibility that an optimal strategy is characterised by a generator u that is associated with the regions
for some 0 ≤ β < α < 1, and is depicted by Figure 6 . In particular, we consider the function
The requirement that u should be continuous at β yields
while, the requirement that u should be C 1 along −α, α, implies that
In view of Theorem 1, we can describe informally the associated optimal strategy as follows. If the initial condition x of (1) belongs to −β, β , then the controller should wait until the uncontrolled state process hits {−β, β}, at which time, the controller should apply an impulse to instantaneously reposition the state process at −α or α, whichever point is closest. As soon as the state process takes values in −∞, −α (resp., [α, ∞[), the controller should exert minimal effort to reflect the state process in −α in the negative direction (resp., in α in the positive direction). On the other hand, the stopper should terminate the game as soon as the state process takes values in S = [−α, α]. 
in which case, β < 1 2λ
. If the problem data satisfy these inequalities, then the function u defined by (77) for A > 0, α ∈ ]0, 1[ given by (79) is a generator of an optimal strategy in the sense of Definition 1.
Proof. It is a matter of straightforward algebra to verify that α > if and only if the first inequality in (80) is true, which we assume in what follows. Similarly, it is a matter of algebraic manipulations to show that the constant on the left-hand side of (80) is strictly less than the constant on the right-hand side of (80). Combining the inequality α >
with the strict concavity of the function x → λx 2 , we can see that there exists β ∈ [0, α[ such that the function u defined by (77) is continuous and u(x) < λx 2 for all x ∈ ]β, α[ if and only if λ ≤ −λα 2 + α + λ, which is equivalent to the second inequality in (80). We now assume that the problem data is such that (80) is true. In view of the arguments above, (76) and Definition 1, we will prove that u is a generator if we show that
u(x) ≥ −λx 2 + λ for all x ≥ α,
The inequalities (81) and (82) follow immediately by the facts that u is C 1 at α, the restriction of x → u(x) + λx 2 − λ in [α, ∞[ is strictly convex and 0 < β < 1 2λ
< α < 1. Finally, the inequality (83) is equivalent to x 2 ≤ 1 + δ −1 for all x ∈ [0, β], which is plainly true because β < 1. 
for some α ∈ ]0, 1[, and is depicted by Figure 7 . In this case, the generator of an optimal strategy is given by u(x) = −x − λα 2 + α + λ, if |x| ∈ [0, α],
The constant A and the free-boundary point α are characterised by the requirement that u should be C 1 along −α, α, and are given by (79). In this case, Theorem 1 implies that the associated optimal strategy can be described informally as follows. The controlled process ξ * has an initial jump equal to −(x + α) (resp., −(x − α)) if the initial condition x of (1) is such that x ∈ −α, 0 (resp., x ∈ ]0, α]). Beyond time 0, ξ * is such that the associated solution to (1) 
